Publication Details
Abstract
Monopolistic enterprises play a structurally important role in national economies, yet their exemption from competitive pressure often weakens efficiency, innovation, and consumer welfare. In monopolized sectors, traditional antitrust has relied largely on external monitoring and punishment, which as rapid and intricate market conditions become more complex seems more impractical. The literature and policy practice pay little attention to internal managerial mechanisms that might indicate a willingness to institutionalize competitive discipline within monopolistic enterprises themselves and to root it within governance- and compliance-based approaches. The purpose of this article is to provide evidence of the benefits of developing a competition-oriented management system in monopolistic companies and to evaluate how antitrust compliance fits into internal governance according to competition principles. The argument makes the case that a functional integration of competition-oriented management and antitrust compliance leads to greater efficiency, transparency, accountability, and responsiveness to market signals, and mutes the allocative losses of monopoly power. Evidence and comparative studies show that these systems act as deterrents, eliminating competition risks at the level of decision making. The study promotes the idea that antitrust compliance should not be approached as a simple legal requirement but seen as a management tool complementing market forces, evolving an internal mimic of competitive pressure in a monopolistic environment. The findings contribute both to the adoption of a performance-oriented and preventive governance model over the control-based antitrust regulation and to sustainable development, enhancing the level of consumer protection and competitive environment at the enterprise and national level.