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Article

Developing a Strategic Model for Public–Private Partnership Management Drawing on International Experience

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Abstract: Public–private partnership (PPP) strategies require a framework that connects investment decisions with service outcomes, risk allocation and long-term fiscal commitments. This article develops a strategic management model by integrating international governance guidance with a reproducible reassessment of an expert-rating dataset contained in the author's underlying research material. The study combines documentary analysis, institutional comparison, within-expert ranking, tie-adjusted Kendall concordance and an illustrative multicriteria assessment. Ten experts assessed five criteria: risk and responsibility, private investment share, coordination, value for money, and monitoring and oversight. Recalculation yields Kendall's W = 0.7494. Monitoring and oversight receive the largest rank-derived weight (0.2867), followed by value for money (0.2767). Using the source's rounded weights, corrected illustrative scores are 0.8700 for alternative A, 0.7625 for C and 0.3725 for B. The proposed model supplements this ranking with mandatory checks for economic justification, fiscal affordability, defensible risk allocation and contractual service requirements. It also separates financial reporting, fiscal statistics and public disclosure. The contribution is a transparent decision architecture suitable for subsequent testing in Uzbekistan; the small expert panel and hypothetical alternatives do not establish causal effectiveness or a universally optimal PPP form.

Keywords: public–private partnership; strategic management; international experience; value for money; risk allocation; fiscal transparency; expert assessment; Kendall concordance; Uzbekistan.

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1. Introduction

A PPP creates a relationship whose operational and fiscal consequences extend well beyond procurement. A government may obtain private finance and specialist delivery capacity while retaining responsibility for access, service standards and affordability. Decisions about project scope, payment design and risk allocation therefore need to be consistent with a long-term public service strategy. Mobilising investment is an intermediate objective: the relevant outcome is a service that remains useful, affordable and accountable over the contractual life cycle.

The underlying research document identifies clear policy objectives, competent institutions, project appraisal, risk management and transparency as the foundations of PPP management [1]. It then proposes five weighted criteria and demonstrates their application to three alternatives. This provides a useful starting point, but a scientific account must distinguish expert preferences from observed project performance and correct inconsistencies between the conceptual principles and numerical rules. A score that

rewards the largest possible private risk exposure, for example, can conflict with the stated principle of allocating each risk to the party best able to manage it.

Incomplete-contract theory explains why bundling construction and operating responsibilities affects incentives when important dimensions of service quality cannot be fully specified [2]. Public-finance analysis further shows that private financing does not by itself release public resources without an associated future payment burden [3], while international performance reviews caution against treating PPP experience in any country as uniform proof of success [4]. International governance guidance complements this theory: the OECD recommendation addresses institutional competence, value for money and budgetary integrity [5]; the World Bank Reference Guide organises policy and project questions across the PPP life cycle [6]; and the European Commission's Economic Appraisal Vademecum distinguishes cost–benefit and multicriteria methods [7]. Cost–benefit analysis (CBA), a public sector comparator (PSC) and value-for-money (VfM) assessment answer related but distinct questions, so alternatives must be compared on a common service scope, time horizon and explicit assumptions. These sources support an emphasis on preparation, but they do not validate particular numerical weights or scoring thresholds.

Transparency likewise rests on complementary frameworks that should not be treated as interchangeable: IPSAS 32 governs grantor accounting for service concession arrangements [8], the IMF Government Finance Statistics Manual governs statistical recording [9], the GIFT principles address fiscal openness and participation [10], and UNECE's people-first evaluation methodology adds a broader public-interest perspective [11]. Institutional practice also varies and changes over time. The United Kingdom discontinued new PFI/PF2 projects in 2018, although obligations under existing contracts remain [12]; France's Fin Infra provides infrastructure financing support within the Treasury [13]; Rijkswaterstaat in the Netherlands applies DBFM contracts and comparator-based assessment [14]; Germany's PD operates as an in-house public sector consultancy [15]; Canada dissolved its federal PPP Canada corporation in 2018 [16]; Japan maintains a PPP/PFI Promotion Office within the Cabinet Office [17]; Portugal's PPP monitoring unit UTAP has been integrated into the Entidade do Tesouro e Finanças [18]; and FHWA guidance in the United States addresses risk valuation and allocation [19]. The transferable lesson is therefore disciplined appraisal and contract management rather than replication of a particular country's organisational label or financing model.

The research question is how these five criteria can be incorporated into a strategic decision process that remains consistent with international experience and public accountability. The objective is to reconstruct the source's calculations, identify the limits of its scoring scheme and develop a management architecture in which eligibility checks precede multicriteria ranking. The contribution comprises an auditable numerical reconstruction and a proposed institutional process. Neither is presented as evidence that PPP delivery outperforms conventional public procurement.

The intended application is Uzbekistan, where the Law on Public–Private Partnership establishes a national legal basis [20]. The article offers analytical recommendations within that context rather than an assessment of compliance by a named project. International arrangements are treated as sources of transferable functions, with attention to their dates and institutional setting.

2. Materials and Methods

The study uses documentary analysis, source verification, comparative institutional analysis, structural analysis of the proposed criteria, within-expert ranking, tie-adjusted concordance analysis, arithmetic reconstruction, illustrative multicriteria assessment and limited sensitivity analysis. Documentary evidence was checked against official publications and primary research sources available on 9 October 2026. This is a

targeted review supporting model development, rather than a systematic review with an exhaustive search protocol.

The empirical input is the 10-by-5 rating matrix reported in the supplied research document. According to that document, the ten experts had at least six years of real-sector experience and used a scale from 1 (very low importance) to 10 (very high importance). Recruitment, assessment date, sector distribution, respondent identities and the questionnaire were not provided. The article reanalyses those supplied responses; it does not claim a newly administered survey, a Delphi process or a representative sample.

For each expert, the five ratings were converted into ascending ranks from 1 to 5; tied observations received their average rank. Let m = 10 experts, n = 5 criteria, r_{ij} denote the rank of criterion i assigned by expert j, and $R_i = \Sigma_j r_{ij}$. The mean rank sum is $\bar{R} = m(n + 1)/2 = 30$. Dispersion is $S = \Sigma_i(R_i - \bar{R})^2$. Tie-adjusted Kendall concordance is calculated as follows:

$$W = 12S / [m^2(n^3 - n) - mT], \quad T = \Sigma_j \Sigma g(tg^3 - tg),$$

where tg is the number of criteria in a tied group within an expert's ratings. The weights are $w_i = R_i / \Sigma_i R_i$. This rank-sum rule gives every criterion a positive weight and retains relative order rather than distances between the original rating values. It is an author-selected aggregation convention; it is not a statistically estimated relationship between a criterion and project outcomes.

For an illustrative alternative a, $q_i a$ is a criterion score normalised to [0, 1], and its aggregate score is $U_a = \Sigma_i w_i q_i a$. The primary reconstruction uses the source's rounded weights (0.21, 0.10, 0.12, 0.28, 0.29) so that corrections can be compared directly. A second calculation retains exact rank-derived weights. Equal weights provide a limited sensitivity check. Products are not rounded before summation.

The source alternatives A, B and C are illustrative combinations of attributes, not identified investment projects. Their scores do not measure realised efficiency. Risk assessment tools discussed in the source—expert judgement, SWOT, Delphi, sensitivity analysis, scenario analysis and simulation—are retained as recommended tools for future appraisal; only the stated documentary and numerical analyses were performed here. No regression, causal estimation, project-level simulation or counterfactual impact evaluation was possible with the supplied information.

3. Results and Discussion

3.1 Governance foundations and international transparency

Table 1. Foundations of strategic PPP management, adapted from source Table 3.1

Foundation	Management requirement	Implementation
Strategy and legal framework	Explicit goals, delivery forms and predictable rules	Set priorities; develop a conceptual model; consult stakeholders; maintain a transparent digital environment
Competent institutions	Project, contract-law and risk assessment skills	Assign coordination and oversight responsibilities; provide staff, funding and authority
Project appraisal	Whole-life cost, quality and public benefit	Apply CBA; develop a comparable PSC; assess VfM
Risk management	Allocate risks to parties able to manage them	Identify, allocate, mitigate and monitor exposure
Transparency and accountability	Accessible information and public responsibility	Publish procurement and progress information; report service KPIs

The institutional model requires more than a formally established PPP unit. An advisory function should structure projects and support contracting authorities; a finance function should review budget commitments and guarantees; a contract-management function should verify performance. Coordination between national and local authorities needs explicit decision rights, escalation routes and access to technical expertise. Excessive procedural restrictions can obstruct justified adaptation, while discretionary changes can weaken competition and accountability. Predictable approval rules should address both risks. Figure 1 summarises the international frameworks for PPP reporting and transparency.




Figure 1. International frameworks for PPP reporting and transparency. English reconstruction of source Figure 3.1, with GFSM 2014 and the IPSAS residual-interest condition added.

IPSAS 32 requires examination of control over services, their recipients and pricing, together with any significant residual interest; a whole-of-life exception applies to the latter condition. Recognition is therefore not determined by service control alone. GFSM 2014 updates the 2001 manual cited in the original diagram and addresses statistical economic ownership.

The criteria are X1: risk and responsibility; X2: private investment share; X3: approval and coordination; X4: value for money; and X5: monitoring and oversight. Table 2 reproduces every supplied expert rating.

Table 2. Expert importance ratings on a 1–10 scale, source Table 3.2

Expert	X1	X2	X3	X4	X5
1	8	6	7	9	10
2	8	5	5	9	9
3	7	6	5	8	9
4	8	6	6	7	8
5	8	5	7	8	8
6	8	6	6	7	9
7	7	7	7	8	8
8	7	6	7	8	7
9	7	7	6	8	7
10	7	6	7	8	8

Table 3. Reconstructed within-expert ranks, source Table 3.3

Criterion	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
X1	3	3	3	4.5	4	4	2	3	3	2.5
X2	1	1.5	2	1.5	1	1.5	2	1	3	1
X3	2	1.5	1	1.5	2	1.5	2	3	1	2.5
X4	4	4.5	4	3	4	3	4.5	5	5	4.5

Criterion	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
X5	5	4.5	5	4.5	4	5	4.5	3	3	4.5
Total	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15

Each expert contributes a rank total of 15, yielding an overall total of 150. Table 4 retains the source's deviation values and corrects the original column labels, which interchanged squared deviations and rank sums.

Table 4. Rank sums, concordance inputs and criterion weights, source Table 3.4 recalculated

Criterion	R_i	d_i	d_i^2	Exact weight	Rounded
X1	32	2	4	0.213333	0.21
X2	15.5	-14.5	210.25	0.103333	0.10
X3	18	-12	144	0.120000	0.12
X4	41.5	11.5	132.25	0.276667	0.28
X5	43	13	169	0.286667	0.29
Total	150	0	659.5	1.000000	1.00

With S = 659.5 and T = 144, W = 12 × 659.5 / [100 × 120 − 10 × 144] = 0.7494318. This confirms the source's rounded value of 0.75. Omitting the tie correction would give 0.6595. Concordance describes agreement within this panel, not accuracy of its judgements. X5 and X4 jointly receive 56.33% of the exact weight; X2 receives 10.33%. The pattern gives greater relative emphasis to public performance and oversight than to maximising the financing share alone.

3.2 Scoring rules and corrected illustrative alternatives

Table 5 preserves every scoring category supplied in source Table 3.5. It records their numerical use without treating the categories as validated performance measures. Investment thresholds are written as non-overlapping intervals to clarify the source's cumulative cut-offs.

Table 5. Source scoring rubric and limitations requiring calibration

Criterion and weight	Source category and score q	Operational limitation
X1 / 0.21	Mainly private risk: 1.00; equal sharing: 0.50; mainly public risk: 0.25	Rewards private transfer regardless of controllability; replace with an allocation-quality measure before deployment
X2 / 0.10	Private share ≥50%: 1.00; 40–<50%: 0.75; 30–<40%: 0.50; 20–<30%: 0.25	Below 20% is unspecified; define the denominator and financing composition
X3 / 0.12	Approvals without delay: 1.00; approved changes affecting parameters: 0.50; rapid deviation-response mechanism: 0.75	Categories may coexist; define measurable and mutually consistent indicators
X4 / 0.28	Favourable BCR/NPV: 1.00; unfavourable BCR/NPV: 0; comparison with direct public procurement: 0.75	Use BCR > 1 and economic NPV > 0 for conventional CBA; comparator existence alone does not demonstrate VfM

X5 / 0.29	Contract compliance: 1.00; noncompliance: 0.25; alignment with state programmes: 1.00; nonalignment: 0.25	Compliance and strategic alignment differ; avoid duplicate rewards and compensating for serious breaches

The source incorrectly describes both BCR and NPV as greater or less than zero. For conventional nonnegative discounted benefit and cost streams, a favourable economic appraisal requires BCR > 1 and economic NPV > 0. An adverse appraisal should be described as failure to meet these conditions, rather than a negative BCR. CBA remains separate from a delivery-mode VfM comparison. The source's binary X4 assignments are retained for numerical reconstruction only.

Alternative A assigns risks mainly to the private partner, has a 60% private investment share, includes approved changes, uses a public procurement price comparison and complies with contractual requirements. B shares risks equally, has a 40% private share and timely approvals, but an unfavourable economic appraisal and noncompliance. C assigns risks mainly to the public partner, has a 30% private share and rapid response arrangements, and is described as economically favourable and aligned with state programmes. These descriptions reproduce the source assumptions; no underlying cash flows or performance records accompany them.

Table 6. Corrected illustrative scores using the source's rounded weights

Criterion	Weight	Aq / wq	Bq / wq	Cq / wq
X1	0.21	1.00 / 0.2100	0.50 / 0.1050	0.25 / 0.0525
X2	0.10	1.00 / 0.1000	0.75 / 0.0750	0.50 / 0.0500
X3	0.12	0.50 / 0.0600	1.00 / 0.1200	0.75 / 0.0900
X4	0.28	0.75 / 0.2100	0 / 0	1.00 / 0.2800
X5	0.29	1.00 / 0.2900	0.25 / 0.0725	1.00 / 0.2900
Total	1.00	0.8700	0.3725	0.7625

The corrected ranking is A > C > B. The source reports 0.87, 0.39 and 0.77 and repeats the label B in its concluding ranking. The main numerical discrepancy results from rounding products before adding them, with some products rounded upward inconsistently. Exact weights give A = 0.870833, B = 0.375833 and C = 0.758333. Equal weights give 0.85, 0.50 and 0.70 respectively, preserving the order. These checks establish arithmetic consistency, not empirical robustness of the scoring definitions.

3.3 Proposed strategic management architecture

The proposed architecture has three connected levels. The policy level specifies service objectives, sector priorities and fiscal boundaries. The project level assesses economic justification, delivery options and contractual design. The operational level monitors performance and updates risk and fiscal information. Infrastructure, environmental services and social services can all be considered, but their eligibility and service indicators should reflect sector-specific needs. A standard numerical template should not eliminate that distinction.

At policy level, the responsible authority should publish a project pipeline explaining the public need, beneficiaries, service baseline and intended outcomes. The ministry or body responsible for public finance should independently examine the budget envelope and proposed guarantees. The advisory unit should supply legal, financial and technical support rather than approve its own project appraisal without challenge. Local implementing authorities require a defined role in land access, permits and service monitoring. These assignments translate the source's institutional requirements into functional responsibilities.

At project level, eligibility should precede ranking. Four mandatory checks are proposed: a defensible public need and economic case; affordable payments and contingent liabilities under adverse scenarios; a documented risk allocation consistent with each party's capacity; and enforceable service, disclosure and legal requirements. A proposal that fails an essential check returns for redesign or is rejected. This is a proposed decision rule, not a threshold estimated from the expert data. It prevents a high score for financing participation or rapid approvals from offsetting an economically unjustified project or a material service failure.

For eligible alternatives, the five-criterion weighted score can organise comparison, subject to recalibrated definitions. Let $G_a = 1$ when all mandatory checks are satisfied and $G_a = 0$ otherwise. The decision process ranks U_a only within the set $\{a: G_a = 1\}$. It does not multiply U_a by G_a and interpret zero as a meaningful project performance estimate. At least one feasible conventional public procurement option should be retained in the comparison; the choice set need not be restricted to PPP forms.

Under this logic, the source description of B gives grounds for exclusion or redesign, rather than simply a low rank. A cannot be declared VfM-positive merely because a price comparison exists, and C cannot be declared contract-compliant merely because it aligns with a state programme. The data are insufficient to establish eligibility for A or C. Thus, A's lead in Table 6 describes the legacy rubric, while a real procurement decision would require additional evidence.

The source properly identifies risk management as a strategic requirement. The operational improvement is to score the quality of allocation rather than the proportion transferred. A risk register should identify the event, exposure, responsible party, mitigation, residual public liability and review trigger. Construction delay and cost overrun may be assigned to the private partner when it controls delivery. Land availability and legislative decisions may remain with the public side. Demand risk requires particular scrutiny: the private party should not automatically bear exposure driven principally by public pricing policy or external conditions.

Public guarantees can reduce lender exposure and potentially borrowing costs, but their fiscal cost and incentive effects must be appraised. A guarantee is not a free efficiency gain. The joint IMF–World Bank PFRAM framework provides a reference for identifying fiscal costs and risks [21]. The proposed process records direct payments, guarantees, termination exposure and relevant stress assumptions before procurement and updates them following approved changes. Financing affordability and economic desirability must both be demonstrated.

The PSC comparison should use equivalent service outputs, whole-life costs, an explicit discount-rate policy, retained risks and transaction costs. CBA adds social effects that may not appear in financial cash flows. Where benefits cannot be monetised credibly, cost-effectiveness or a clearly specified multicriteria approach may supplement the analysis. Numerical scores should not conceal missing evidence by assigning a neutral value. The appraisal should record an unassessed component explicitly and explain whether it prevents a decision.

Monitoring converts the strategy into a continuing service obligation. Contract-specific KPIs should cover availability, service quality, completion milestones and financial discipline, with baseline values, reporting frequency, verification and payment consequences specified in advance. Programme alignment is assessed separately: a project can meet a policy priority yet breach its service agreement. Complaints and user feedback should complement technical inspection, especially where access and affordability affect vulnerable users.

A digital disclosure portal should present procurement documents, the project rationale, approved contractual summaries, material changes and implementation reports, subject to justified legal restrictions. Public consultation should occur early enough to affect design. During operation, documented change control should connect deviations

with remedial action and revised fiscal forecasts. Contract expiry requires planning for asset condition, continuity of service and transfer obligations. Information generated in operation should feed the next round of project selection and weight calibration.

3.4 Limitations and implications for Uzbekistan

The analysis supports a management strategy that places oversight and VfM at its centre. The expert panel's priorities are consistent with that emphasis, but this consistency is descriptive. The data do not show that higher oversight scores cause better services, or that the proposed weighting is suitable across sectors. International practice supplies design principles and counterexamples; it does not provide a homogeneous outcome dataset for validating the five-criterion model.

Several limitations affect the original rubric. First, the X1 scale confuses desirable allocation with greater private transfer. Second, the X2 thresholds privilege larger private shares without considering the cost of capital, equity leverage, guarantees or payment exposure. Third, the X3 categories describe different aspects of decision-making and can overlap. Fourth, the X4 scale mixes economic appraisal with the existence of a comparator. Finally, X5 combines contractual compliance and policy alignment. These issues cannot be resolved by recalculating weights alone.

Rank-sum weighting also requires caution. It assumes that rank positions can be aggregated into cardinal weights, gives all criteria a minimum contribution and does not model interactions. A weighted sum allows strong performance in one dimension to compensate for weak performance in another. Mandatory eligibility checks address the most consequential instances of compensation, but residual trade-offs remain. A > C > B under equal and exact weights is a narrow sensitivity result: alternative scales, sector-specific weights or revised risk scores could alter the ordering.

For Uzbekistan, the practical proposal is to pilot the decision architecture using a small set of comparable projects and a conventional procurement benchmark. A prospective protocol should define the unit of analysis, recruitment and expertise of assessors, scoring anchors, fiscal scenarios and service outcomes. Independent assessors should rate the same dossiers to examine reliability. The study should then compare appraisal predictions with observed cost, availability and quality over time, while recognising selection bias and the difficulty of constructing a credible counterfactual.

Institutional adaptation should prioritise functions rather than foreign organisational labels. An advisory unit with strong technical staff cannot substitute for independent fiscal review, and a disclosure portal cannot substitute for enforceable contract remedies. The source's call for adequate authority, funding, intergovernmental interaction and professional competence is therefore retained. Country experience is useful when the relevant mechanism—such as comparator appraisal, contract monitoring or transparent fiscal recording—is identified and adapted to the national legal environment.

4. Conclusion

The principal result is a corrected and more defensible framework for strategic PPP management. Ten supplied expert assessments yield substantial within-panel agreement and the highest weights for oversight and VfM. The recalculated illustrative ranking is A > C > B, but no alternative is proven optimal. A decision architecture combining eligibility checks, transparent multicriteria comparison and life-cycle monitoring offers a basis for subsequent empirical assessment. Its value lies in making assumptions, responsibilities and evidence requirements reviewable before long-term commitments are made.Three practical implications follow. First, PPP proposals in Uzbekistan should pass mandatory checks of economic justification, fiscal affordability, defensible risk allocation and enforceable service requirements before any weighted ranking is applied. Second, the scoring rubric should be recalibrated so that risk is scored by the quality of allocation rather than the share transferred, and contractual compliance is assessed separately from programme alignment. Third, financial reporting, fiscal

statistics and public disclosure should be maintained as distinct but connected obligations across the contract life cycle. Future research should pilot the framework on comparable projects with a conventional procurement benchmark, a larger and documented expert panel, and observed cost, availability and quality outcomes.

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